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Résumé
This paper responds to Susan Campbell’s “On ‘Modest Proposals’ to
Further Reduce the Aboriginal Landbase by Privatizing Reserve Land”
that appeared in The Canadian Journal of Native Studies XXVII: 2 (2007).
Specifically, this paper suggests that her characterization of Alcantara’s
work as supporting the privatization of Reserve lands is inaccurate. Instead, the original article and the ones published afterwards argue that
it is possible to use market-based approaches to improve economic
development conditions on Canadian Indian Reserves. To do so, however, does not require the privatization of Reserve lands.
L’auteur répond à l’article de Susan Campbell intitulé « On ‘Modest
Proposals’ to Further Reduce the Aboriginal Landbase by Privatizing
Reserve Land » qui est paru dans la Revue canadienne des études
autochtones (XXVII, 2, 2007). Plus particulièrement, le présent article
soutient que la caractérisation par S. Campbell du travail de C. Alcantara
comme un soutien à la privatisation des terres de réserve est inexacte.
Au contraire, l’article original et les autres publiés subséquemment
mettent de l’avant qu’il est possible d’avoir recours à des approches
axées sur le marché pour améliorer les conditions du développement
économique des réserves indiennes au Canada. Pour y arriver, par contre,
il n’est pas nécessaire de privatiser les terres de réserve.
The Canadian Journal of Native Studies XXVIII, 2(2008):421-427.
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In a recent edition of The Canadian Journal of Native Studies, Susan
Campbell argues that my article, “Individual Property Rights on Canadian Indian Reserves,” advocates for the privatization of all Aboriginal
reserve lands in Canada. To show that privatization would be disastrous,
she suggests that the Dawes Act in the United States had extremely
negative consequences for its Indian tribes. Based on these experiences,
she suggests Aboriginal peoples and policy makers in Canada should
oppose and reject all market-based approaches to on-reserve economic
development (Campbell, 2007: 34).
Unfortunately, she has misunderstood and mischaracterized my arguments as they relate to individual property rights and economic development on Canadian Indian reserves. Indeed, in none of my publications do I suggest that Canadian Indian reserves should be privatized.
Rather, my work acknowledges that the privatization of Indian reserve
lands as it occurred under the Dawes Act was disastrous. Nonetheless,
the failure of the Dawes Act in the United States should not automatically lead to a rejection of all market-based approaches to Aboriginal
economic development. Instead, my work suggests that it is possible
for First Nations interested in participating in the market-based economy
of Canada to do so successfully without having to sacrifice their core
values and beliefs, including those relating to land tenure.
To defend these arguments, this paper is divided into three sections. The first analyzes several statements in Campbell’s article that
supposedly indicate that I advocate the privatization of reserve lands.
The second section reviews the key findings of my work on individual
property rights on Canadian Indian reserves to show how existing property rights regimes have greatly hampered Aboriginal efforts to engage
in economic development. The final section discusses several ways that
Aboriginal groups interested in participating in the Canadian economy
can improve their prospects for successful economic development. None
of these suggestions advocate or require the privatization of reserve
lands.
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In my original CJNS article, published in 2003, I wrote that “the CP
[Certificates of Possession] system gives individual Indians living on reserves property rights that fall somewhere between fee simple [i.e. outright ownership] and life estate interests.” Campbell (2007: 221) quotes
this statement before providing the following commentary: “Alcantara
skated over the qualitative difference between reserves as they are now
and as they would be—or cease to be—if privatized” (the emphasis is
Campbell’s). Campbell (2007: 221) also states that “Alcantara implied
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that privatization of reserve land would be a modest step in the right
direction, one that might even be couched in terms compatible with
Aboriginal self-government, or more accurately ‘self-administration.’” Her
analysis of my original article, however, is inaccurate. Neither my original quote above, nor any other statements in my original article, implied
that privatization of reserve lands should occur. Instead, the article simply described how the CP system worked and what historical conditions facilitated its creation. The original paper also offered some suggestions for reforming the CP system, which included modifying the Indian Act to deal with the division of matrimonial real property, giving
band councils greater control over the granting of leases on Indian reserves, and removing the federal Department of Indian Affairs from CP
transactions (Alcantara, 2003: 419-420).
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So what do I in fact argue? Here, it would be helpful to reflect on
some of the findings that Tom Flanagan and I have produced since the
publication of the first two articles cited by Campbell (Alcantara, 2003;
Flanagan and Alcantara, 2004). The puzzle that our research is trying to
address is the persistence of poverty on many Canadian Indian reserves.
Based on empirical work completed on reserves in British Columbia,
Alberta, and Ontario, we suggest that a major source of drag on onreserve economic development is the Indian Act. According to the act,
all lands reserved for Indians are held by the Crown to be used by Indian
bands to occupy and live on. In practice, however, the bands, through
their band councils, exercise primary usage and occupancy rights over
all reserve lands (Alcantara, 2007: 424). Band members can gain individual possession of reserve lands through three mechanisms: customary rights, certificates of possession (CPs), and leases. Under customary rights, band members can take possession of a tract of land either
through a band council resolution recognizing their ownership, or through
informal recognition by community members. In either case, however,
the individual’s customary rights are not legally enforceable in Canadian
courts, meaning that the use of said lands is at the discretion of the
band council (Flanagan and Alcantara, 2006).
The second form of property right under the Indian Act is the certificate of possession. CPs provide a stronger form of property right to
band members because they have a statutory basis. Once granted, CPs
are enforceable in Canadian courts, meaning that band councils and
other individuals cannot interfere with the band member’s use of her
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land. The main weakness of CPs, however, is the significant transaction
costs stemming from the time it takes to complete CP transactions. An
allotment usually requires the approval of the band council and the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs. Approval from INAC can be particularly time consuming, with one case at Six Nations, near Brantford,
Ontario, taking ten years to complete. Transfers and wills can also be
time consuming because they require the approval of INAC before they
can be completed (Alcantara, 2005).
The final individual property right is the lease, which is quite similar
to a lease off-reserve. Indian Act leases, unlike the other property regimes, are fully tradable and can be used as collateral for loans and
mortgages. First Nations in British Columbia and Alberta have successfully used leases to construct golf courses, commercial developments,
and residential developments on their reserve lands. Unfortunately, leases
also suffer from significant transaction costs since individuals desiring
leases must seek the approval of the band council and/or the Minister of
Indian Affairs, depending on the type of lease. As well, some of the leases
are administered by Indian Affairs, thus weakening tribal sovereignty.
Finally, the courts have called into question the economic viability of
such leases. In 2000, the Supreme Court of Canada in Musqueam v.
Glass ruled that the unique features of reserve land may result in reserve
lands having lower land values than their off-reserve equivalents. As a
result, First Nations governments and individuals may have to charge
lower rents to off-reserve residents who lease their lands (Flanagan and
Alcantara, 2005).

u Solutions
o i ns
Our
In light of these findings, perhaps surprisingly to Campbell and others, we do not advocate for the top-down imposition of fee simple title
writ large and the immediate and universal abolition of Indian reserves
in Canada. Indeed, we are highly cognizant of the failure that privatization
wrought on American Indian reservations during the Dawes Act era.
Building on the lessons from that time period, we instead offer some
practical suggestions for how interested First Nations might reduce the
drag on development that the Indian Act has imposed on them. For
instance, with respect to customary rights, we suggest that the bands
fully document their customary rights through formalized surveys and
recording practices, appoint independent committees to oversee their
administration, and create rules or foster norms that require band councils to treat these customary rights as legally binding contracts. We also
suggest that First Nations consider creating independent dispute resolution mechanisms or First Nation Courts for dealing with disputes relat-
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ing to customary rights (Flanagan and Alcantara, 2006: 155-157).
With respect to CPs, I suggest in an article published in Canadian
Journal of Law and Society that the Department of Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada be removed from CP transactions. To do so would require using ss. 53 and 60 of the Indian Act, which allow the Governor-inCouncil to assign control and management of reserve lands to band
councils, or to use other institutional mechanisms like the First Nations
Land Management Act (FNLMA) or negotiated self-government agreements (Alcantara, 2005: 199-200; Alcantara, 2008a). Indeed, my research
on the FNLMA found that the land codes emerging out of the legislation
could significantly reduce transaction costs because they allowed First
Nations to exit the land management provisions of the Indian Act. Quoting economic historian Leonard Carlson, an authority on the Dawes Act,
I suggest that the FNLMA was a positive development for First Nations
interested in pursuing market-based economic development because it
allowed Aboriginal peoples “to adapt or retain those features of traditional culture that they chose and to accept or reject ideas and values
taken from White society with a relatively small amount of interference
from federal agents” (Carlson, 1981: 176-177, quoted in Alcantara, 2007:
431).
Furthermore, we do not suggest that all First Nations in Canada
should adopt these proposals. Instead, “we offer a few suggestions for
how customary rights [and the other property regimes] could be made
to work better for those First Nations that find them to be a good fit with
their culture but who also wish to participate successfully in the modern
economy” (Flanagan and Alcantara, 2006: 155). In a recent article of mine
(Alcantara, 2008b), I suggest that Aboriginal and federal policy makers
adopt the principle of subsidiarity when engaging in Aboriginal policy
reform. In essence, using the FNLMA as a template, different First Nations should consider negotiating with the federal government to establish locally-sensitive framework legislation on the issue of individual property rights. Currently, First Nations have access to three types of land
management regimes: the status quo of the Indian Act as described
above, negotiated self-government agreements, and the FNLMA. The
latter regime is most interesting because of its potential for solving not
only the land management problem, but also other problems relating to
Aboriginal public policy in Canada. The FNLMA came about as a result
of fourteen First Nations who approached the federal government to
create a new legislative framework. They hoped to use this framework
to exit the relevant provisions of the Indian Act to create their own land
management regimes. One could imagine other First Nations collectively
negotiating alternative legislative frameworks with the federal govern-
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ment that were more relevant to their particular needs.

n
n
Conclusion
Campbell’s article is correct to cast significant doubt on suggestions that Canada emulate the privatization model adopted in the United
States. Unfortunately, she is incorrect to suggest that my research advocates this position. Instead, my work identifies several significant obstacles to successful Aboriginal economic development on Canadian
Indian reserves and offers a number of market-based solutions that First
Nations should consider if they are interested in participating in the Canadian economy. Further work is needed on whether market-based approaches can be integrated with Aboriginal traditional values to produce what David Newhouse calls “red capitalism” (Newhouse, 2000).
My work, so far, suggests that this integration is possible and that the
privatization of Canadian reserve lands is neither necessary nor desirable.
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